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This article is part of a new series on The Strategy Bridge analyzing some of the issues
surrounding the problem of #TechnologyInnovation.
The Defense Innovation Board stated that what the Pentagon has is not a problem
innovating, but, rather, a problem adopting innovations. A better understanding of the
existing and emerging pathways for rapid adoption of technology helps to solve this
adoption problem. Innovation is a term used broadly in today’s business and defense world
with a myriad of definitions and understandings. For the purpose of this analysis, innovation
simply refers to significant positive change, as defined by Scott Berkun. In a military career,
one may see multiple examples in which technological innovation has given a significant
advantage to one side or another. Conversely, there are just as many examples of
technology and ideas stalled by bureaucracy, delaying and sometimes preventing
equipment that could provide warfighters a critical advantage from reaching the battlefield.
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A Vought SB2U Vindicator from the USS Ranger flies anti-submarine patrol over Convoy WS12 en
route to Cape Town, 27 November 1941. (U.S. Navy Naval History Center/Wikimedia)
Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, the Allies synchronized and
operationalized tactical level innovations which proved to be key factors in success, while a
lack of innovation hindered the German effort. The advent of Air-to-Surface Radar was
crucial in helping aircraft locate U-boats from five miles out. However, the surface radar on
aircraft and eventually on ships was an incomplete solution; a gap in detection from air
persisted when an aircraft came within one mile of the target due to sea distortion. During
daylight hours, the pilots could maintain a visual lock on the U-boats, but at night the pilots
lost sight. A junior Royal Air Force officer personally developed a searchlight to attach to an
anti-submarine aircraft, which the pilot would turn on once radar fidelity was lost.[1] This
innovation was immediately operationalized by the Royal Air Force's anti-submarine
force. The three key developments that came together for the Allies at the end of 1942 to
begin turning the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic were long-range air cover; more efficient
radars, direction-finiding equipment, weapons, and communications gear; and more escort
vessels.[2] The Germans not only lacked comparable improvements, but also were unable
to man new U-boats with properly trained sailors or experienced skippers. In the later part
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of 1942, the Allies saw a 400-500% increase in German U-boats sunk compared to the first
few months of that same year.[3] This strategic victory in the Battle of the Atlantic would not
have been possible without innovation at every level, a culture that promoted innovation,
and a willingness and system to rapidly operationalize these improvements. A
technologically superior force does not equate to a victorious force. How one identifies,
scales, and applies the right technology for a situation is the key factor.
The United States Government has continuously looked for more efficient and effective
ways to acquire and develop technology. In 1957, the Russians launched Sputnik 2 into
orbit, signalling the United States Government that it had fallen behind in the space race. In
response, President Dwight Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, creating NASA, and granting it the first use of an Other Transaction Authority.[4]
President Eisenhower saw the need to grant NASA more flexible acquisition authorities in
order for it to rapidly develop the technological means to lead the space race. Additionally,
the launch of Sputnik 2 spurred the creation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, an organization tasked with ensuring that the United States Government was at the
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forefront of any future military technological developments. These two serve as the
beginnings of the creation of a multitude of innovative organizations across the Department
of Defense.
If the Department of Defense has been creating innovative organizations throughout its
history, with NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as early examples,
why does this problem of adopting innovation persist? This article provides a heuristic
framework of typical Department of Defense problems that, when applied to any of the
multitude of United States Government entities that exist to aid in technology adoption, will
help a Department of Defense element in the rapid development and implementation of
new technology in a more efficient manner.
The Department of Defense generally defines a need for new technology in terms of
requirements. Others like Steve Blank, in work with Pete Newell, argues that it should
instead focus on curating a problem. This is an argument for a problem-based framework—
fully understanding the problem statement, identifying use cases, and doing proper market
research. Nonetheless, a common set of characteristics define problems facing today’s
Department of Defense entities. Focusing on specific characteristics allows for the creation
of a framework to apply to the United States Government’s innovative organizations. The
five proposed categories are: requirement sourcing, funding, technology horizon, solution
methodology, and the United States Government relationship. These categories help
objectively define an organization.
The requirement sourcing drives internal projects or customer-based problems. Where
does the organization receive its demand signal from? Is it a push from inside the
organization or a greater strategic directive, or is it a pull from an outside customer?
Organizations span from those driven by Department of Defense requirements
documentation and others investing in long term emerging technology that could prove
useful. From a customer’s perspective this helps understand how willing an organization will
be to an external problem that the organization is not currently focused on.
Each of the organizations have a specific solution methodology in place to adopt and
integrate technology into the Department of Defense. The technique by which an
organization curates and dissects a problem and then processes a solution defines its
solution methodology. Traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation processes and
organizational authorities drive the solution process.
These processes tie to the method of purchase or prototyping for a technology, the type
and amounts of money required, and how the Department of Defense integrates it into use
through the acquisition process. While the Pentagon operates with five major categories of
funding, the three that are significant for this discussion are Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E); Procurement; and Operation and Maintenance (O&M). Not all
Department of Defense organizations have access to all types of funds, nor do they all have
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access to significant amounts. Factors such as amount, level of readiness of a technology,
and purchasing mechanism dictate the type of funding required for a problem. Additionally,
organizations fill roles as funders or enablers, defined by the organization’s ability to
internally fund efforts or requirement for external funding from a Department of Defense
customer. This is a critical component when deciding how to resource funding.
The type of funding relates to how Department of Defense innovations fit into the
innovation technology horizon model. McKinsey and Company refers to a three-horizon
framework for companies to assess their growth. Horizon One represents the core business
model and support to existing programs, Horizon Two covers emerging opportunities that
require further investment or are a significant extension of existing programs, and Horizon
Three focuses on long-term growth or disruptive capabilities. This growth model applies as
an innovation taxonomy, which provides a useful analysis of the various Department of
Defense innovative organizations. Problems range from slight modifications to current
products and capabilities to disruptive technologies that may not be fully understood yet.
Commercial-off-the-shelf products readily answer some Department of Defense problems,
while others require modification, prototyping, or science and research into a specific field.
Finally, the organization’s United States Government relationship defines where it best
resources problems from, based on its ties to operational units, defense contractors,
academia, or commercial industry. Additionally, this relationship dictates the employee
structure at times. How an organization balances its civilians, mix of active duty or reserve
military, retired military, federal employees, or government contractors, gives the core of
the organization a background and expertise. This expertise provides a certain perspective
on a problem and also dictates classification level of problems.
(BMNT Partners)
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE provides a case study on applying the framework to an
organization and a problem. A SEAL team took a problem of underwater diver monitoring to
Stanford’s Hacking for Defense class, a class where student teams select and tackle some of
the Pentagon’s unsolved problems. The Hacking for Defense team, team aquaLink, chose
the problem the SEALs proposed of creating a vital monitoring system for divers that could
provide early warning of the onset of diving medical injuries. Through Hacking for Defense’s
5/8
discovery process and aquaLink’s direct interaction with the operators, the team realized
the majority of the operators were much more concerned about solving the underwater
geolocation problem. This has been a problem for the community for some time, but not
documented by an existing operational deficiency report or standing Department of
Defense requirement. aquaLink created a floatable GPS antenna to release at depth and
integrate with the SEAL’s navigation system while submerged.
A member of Team AquaLink conducts an underwater test on an experimental GPS buoy as part
of the Hacking for Defense course at Stanford University. (Team AquaLink/Stars and Stripes)
Dissecting this problem and analyzing the Hacking for Defense process, one can begin to
see the characteristics identified above.
Sourcing: An existing requirement did not outline the problem, requiring an organization
with a process for prototyping and discovery. The Pentagon’s documented requirements do
not necessarily drive Hacking for Defense’s problems. Although teams of students do have
the option to introduce their solutions to problems they have identified, the primary pull for
the class comes from newly submitted problems. Student teams self-organize at the
beginning of the course and select from a bank of problems based on their own interests.
Methodology: Once the teams form around selected problems, the course begins to iterate
on solutions, employing the Lean Startup methodology. The method does not focus on the
acquisition process, but instead focuses on the problem’s solution. At the end of the
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quarter, the team’s goal is to produce a minimum viable product for the Defense problem
sponsor.
Funding Enablers: Hacking for Defense serves the role of an enabler for problem solutions.
Student teams receive $3,000 in funding to cover travel costs and prototyping and rely on
the Department of Defense problem sponsor to determine the best method for acquisition
and funding if the solution is viable at the end of the course. Here, in our example case,
United States Special Operations Command would have funded any further development or
purchasing of products once the class concluded. Students interact throughout the course
with the sponsor to begin to map future funding options as part of their course
requirements. The type of funding required by the sponsor at the end will vary based on
acquisition law.
Horizon: The majority of the minimum viable product the student teams produce fit in the
Horizon One and Horizon Two bins for technology. It is not impossible, but, due to course
time constraints, they are unlikely to reach into technologies that fall into the category of
Horizon Three. The horizon bins outlined here attempt to fit the organization into where it
primarily operates. The technology the SEALs were looking for did not have a commercial
solution that anyone had identified, nor had the supporting defense contractor provided a
solution.
United States Government Relationship: The students in the Hacking for Defense class
usually have no military background or security clearance, and the SEALs presented an
unclassified problem. The relationship of Hacking for Defense to the United States
Government is that of an academic research institution. Academia often provides unique
solutions to Department of Defense problems that that larger organizations do not
consider. Teams pair with a mentor, a point of contact from the problem sponsor, and a
military liaison. This allows regular interaction with the problem sponsor to provide insight
into the day-to-day challenges the military’s uses place on the technological solutions.
In conclusion, one can easily apply this framework to any United States Government
organization focused on problem solving and technology adoption. The framework provides
an ontology that, based on one’s problem or area of focus, helps identify characteristics of
the problem that could drive an organizational pairing. This analysis does not seek to prove
that any specific organization is superior to the other, rather it provides an initial framework
to begin organizing the myriad of technological organizations that support the United States
Government. Without specific technology case studies, a determination cannot be made
whether any individual factor or category determines the success of the organization.
However, this framework provides an initial understanding of these factors to help a
potential customer leverage these organizations for rapid development and implementation
of new technologies.
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